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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
REAGAN GRIFFITH, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20050200-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of methamphetamine, a third degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004); obstruction of 
justice, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN . § 76-8-306( 1 )(b) (West 2004); 
and driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6(2) (West 2004). 
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did Trooper Watkins have probable cause to conduct a warrantless automobile 
search where he observed defendant and her passenger furtively try to conceal items 
he recognized from his training and experience as drug paraphernalia? 
1 
The appellate court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 
11, 100 P.3d 1222. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for 
correctness, including its application of the legal standard to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 
UT 95, T[ll, 103P.3d699. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged by information with possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony; obstruction of justice, a third degree felony; and 
driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. 
R117-118. 
Motion to suppress denied. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence 
discovered in a warrantless automobile search. See R146-142. 
Conditional Guilty Plea. Defendant entered conditional guilty pleas as charged. 
Rl 14-104; see also Rl 16. 
2 
Sentence. On 28 January 2005, the trial court imposed the statutory indeterminate 
terms of from zero to five years for each of defendant's two felony convictions, and a thirty-
day jail term for defendant's misdemeanor conviction. R126-125. The trial court then 
suspended imposition of the felony terms and placed defendant on a thirty-six month term 
of probation. R124. 
Timely Notice of Appeal. On 25 February 2005, defendant filed a timely notice of 
appeal. R132. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
A warrantless search of the passenger compartment of defendant's vehicle yielded 
approximately forty grams of methamphetamine and related drug paraphernalia. R8-7. 
Following a preliminary hearing held on 30 July 2004, and an evidentiary hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress held on 19 November 2004, the trial court found the 
following facts: 
1. On the morning of May 2, 2004, Trooper Harley Watkins was 
patrolling Highway 6 as part of his regular duties when he 
observed a vehicle parked at a vacant store in the Soldier 
Summit area of Wasatch County.2 Trooper Watkins stopped to 
see if the occupants of the vehicle needed assistance, as the 
^ h e facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's written ruling 
denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah 
App. 1997). 
2Judge Eyre also conducted the preliminary hearing, and reviewed the preliminary 
hearing transcript prior to ruling in this case. Compare R134 and R152:3. Evidence 
adduced at the preliminary hearing established that defendant's car was running when the 
trooper approached. See R134:4, 12. 
3 
nearest town was around 20 miles away. Unbeknownst to 
Trooper Watkins, Defendant was in the driver's seat of the 
parked vehicle ingesting or preparing to ingest 
methamphetamine. 
2. Trooper Watkins approached and parked behind and to the left 
of Defendant's vehicle. His manner of parking did not restrain 
or impede the ability of Defendant to move her vehicle had she 
chosen to do so. Trooper Watkins did not turn on his red-and-
blue lights or any take-down lights. He simply parked his patrol 
vehicle, exited it, and approached Defendant's vehicle. 
3. Upon arriving at Defendant's vehicle, Trooper Watkins tapped 
on the driver's side window to get Defendant's attention. Both 
Defendant and her passenger were leaning forward, hunched 
over the center console. Trooper Watkins's tap startled 
Defendant. When Defendant looked up, Trooper Watkins was 
able to see that she possessed a rolled-up dollar bill, which she 
then dropped. Trooper Watkins was also able to see that her 
passenger was holding a napkin and a butane lighter, which he 
was trying to conceal. 
4. Defendant and her passenger, upon observing Trooper Watkins, 
became very nervous and appeared to be attempting to conceal 
their activities.3 
specifically, Trooper Watkins saw defendant "leanfing] into the center console. 
And when [he] tapped on the door she came up startled[:] Her hands were opened and she 
jumped and jerked and her eyes were huge, her eyes were as big as silver dollars. She 
was obviously nervous []." Rl52:29. According to Trooper Watkins, defendant dropped 
the rolled bill after realizing he was a police officer: "As she came up startled, saw that I 
was a cop, and her hands opened at that time and that's when the bill dropped." Id. The 
trooper further observed that defendant "was very very scared" and "based on [her] body 
language[,] the totality of the circumstances[,] there was something inside the car she 
didn't want [him] to see." Rl52:28. 
Trooper Watkins also saw defendant's passenger "lean[ing] into the center 
console." Rl52:29. Like defendant, the passenger also had something in his hand as he 
came up "that he was trying to conceal and hide, kept trying to move it and that's what 
drew [the trooper's] attention to the lighter, to the butane lighter." Id. The passenger's 
4 
5 Trooper Watkins asked Defendant where she was going, and she 
responded that she was coming from the Las Vegas area on 
Interstate 15 and was gong to Interstate 70. Trooper Watkins 
observed that, in that event, sb? had missed ] T !KW< .IV by 200 
miles. 
( Trooper Watkins has substantial training and experience in the 
recognition of illegal drugs and their associated paraphernalia, 
including service undercover on a narcotics interdiction task 
force. Trooper Watkins testified that he had found rolled-up 
bills and lighters similar to the one Defendant's passenger was 
holding on many prior occasions in drug encounters. He further 
testified that he had never observed anybody light tobacco with 
such a lighter. This type of lighter, he testified, shoots a flame 
much larger than a typical cigarette lighter, and is used, in his 
experience, almost exclusively for the ingestion of drugs. 
7. The Court finds tnai i rooper Watkins's training and experience 
are sufficient to inform him and the Court that he recognized the 
rolled-up dollar bill and the butane torch as drug paraphernalia, 
The trooper's conclusion was further supported by his 
observation that Defendant and her passenger were easily 
startled and became very nervous and apparently intent on 
concealing their activities. 
R146-143 (a copy of the trial court's Findings of Fact Conclusioi is of I aw, A oci < 
Denying Motion to Suppress is attached in the addendum). 
i^aseu on i:^._ ladings, the trial court concluded that "Trooper Watkins's initial 
contact with Defendant was ,. [ : ,.T :r..* \1* •• : n.^u-h -w.:c:.: _ o 
assist," and that "[u]pon viewing the drug paraphernalia and the behavior of Defendant and 
"eyes were also as big as saucers. And he was, he was nervous, he was tense, his body 
language, he was very tense and up-tight. He appeared to be very very worried about 
having [the trooper] there," TC1 52:3? 
5 
her passenger/' the trooper had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of their 
vehicle. R143. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trooper Watkins had probable cause to conduct the warrantless automobile search 
here at issue. He observed from a lawful vantage point items he immediately recognized 
from his training and experience as drug paraphernalia, a tightly rolled bill, napkin, and a 
large butane lighter. Although defendant and her passenger could have possessed these items 
for an innocent purpose, their nervous reactions to the trooper's appearance, and their furtive 
attempts to conceal the items, reasonably suggested to the trooper that defendant and her 
passenger had been using these items to ingest controlled substances. Given the totality of 
the circumstances confronting the trooper, including the additional facts that defendant's car 
was stopped in front of a vacant building twenty miles from the nearest town, and that she 
was 200 miles off course from her stated destination, the trial court properly determined that 
Trooper Watkins had probable cause to believe defendant and her passenger were engaged 
in criminal activity, and that the warrantless search of their vehicle for the suspected 
contraband was therefore justified. The trial court's sound ruling should be affirmed. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
T R O O p E R WATKINS HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A 
WARRANTLESS AUTOMOBILE SEARCH WHERE HE OBSERVED 
DEFENDANT AND HER PASSENGER FURTIVELY TRY TO 
CONCEAL ITEMS HE RECOGNIZED FROM HIS TRAINING AND 
EXPERIENCE AS DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Although the a uii toun u,J ,iot specifically identify which exception to the warrant 
. . ."lit* * \ )\c\ ' • . - . . » . ,irraiuic-^ ^ j . i 
defendant's vehicle-here, the search was justified under the automobile exception.4 See 
R146-143. add. \ Indeed, under the automobile exception, "[i]f a car is readily mobile and 
PK ^ •• ,v, .^. , .1", in IIL'IICNC il c '
 t. .:,. .•.-;;.; J.IMIK:. ihw rourtn Amendment. . .permits 
police to search the vehicle without more," Maryland v. /Vsnn S'17 11 S IAS U^H'1 0 0) 
(quotingPennsylvania w Tehran. 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (emphasis added)). 
Defendant argued below that her initial encounter with the trooper amounted to an 
nniu>r;^\'! >ri--I;-' • * ippoa1. «lofV-^ l;pn .1,^-. • .• ]\d\> -LX ib* . • .-IPJ.. .• •. 
Trooper Watkins's "initial approach to the defendant's car [was] a level one [voluntary] 
encounter." Aplt. Rr, at 12.5 Rather, defendant's only challenge is to the trial court's ruling 
4Although defendant cites to both the federal and state constitutions in his brief; he 
engages in no analysis of the state constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 10. His reliance on the 
state constitution is therefore nominal and should not be addressed. See State v. Lafferty, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247, n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a general rule, we will not engage in state 
constitutional analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the state and 
federal constitutions is briefed."). 
defendant's brief lacks page numbers, but the table of contents does list numbers 
for various pages in the brief; therefore, the State relies on the table of contents to 
approximate the appropriate page in referencing defendant's brief. 
7 
that the warrantless search was justified by probable cause. Aplt. Br. at 14-19. Accordingly, 
there is no dispute that defendant's vehicle was readily mobile for purposes of the automobile 
exception, see Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467. 
The sole issue on appeal is therefore whether the trial court properly found that 
defendant's, and her passenger's, nervous and furtive conduct in attempting to conceal items 
the trooper recognized—in his training and experience—as drug paraphernalia, amounted 
to probable cause. For the reasons explained below, Trooper Watkins articulated probable 
cause to conduct the warrantless vehicle search and the trial court's ruling should thus be 
upheld. 
Probable cause standard, "The determination of whether probable cause exists" for 
a warrantless search of an automobile, as here, "depends upon an examination of all the 
information available to the searching officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time the search was made." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (citing 
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160,176(1949)). See also Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132,149 (1925) (probable cause is "abelief, reasonably arising out of the circumstances 
known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law 
is subject to seizure and destruction"). It is "a flexible, common-sense standard[,]" and 
"merely requires that the facts available to the officer would 'warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief,' . . . that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful 
as evidence of a crime[.]" Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (quoting Carroll, 267 
8 
U.S. at 162). "[I]t does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely 
.•: , . *J::_: -ruuijai. nontechnical' probability that incriminating 
evidence is involved is all that is required."* / 7 Muotin -  Rirt*«nir " ^ *' ^ 
words, "[t]he process" of calculating probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but 
with probabilities. ,«.
 v quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981). Just as 
w
" p r . h . " i c c i ! < • . ,'!* f • - . < • • • , M, '• , j w i i > , n J ' I L I M O : 
may "law enforcement officers." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, 
evidence pointing to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search "must be seen and 
weigb^h ,.-i >.s*u \\\K.W: .VIJA^ -:>^\ .^:A.U;IS. ;ua as understood in those versed in the 
field of law enforcement. "Id. (internal qu ' r- • *I s.» ' . iimi 
Accordingly, the probable cause standard also recognizes that "[pjolice officers by 
virtue .>; ,,^r; experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity where 
r-i* < -'/.MIS' orefW \ [ - vniL' ILXOUIIIL^ .: 
should appropriately be given to that experience and training where there are objective facts 
to justify the ultimate conclusion." Id. (citations omitted). See United States v. Arvizu, 534 
* . *• . *i"Lct»L;ii]/i:iLL ;.;^ cr.!oicemciu oiucers are allowed **> draw on their 
own experience and specialized training to make inleivrkv Voiv : \ - : !-
cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person" (internal 
V.i*••;.!•,. -a u.arivs ai.u ciuuion omitted)). &i\ ULSO State v. Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 1 ° 
111 P .3d 808 (rec< -n ix ing \ :d-'*i \ •- ^ p ^ l x i h k O ^ I M 1 ' ! , ^ - ' nat ion • -lU!v:-. :-••..: L>|CCLI\C 
9 
standpoint of reasonable officer including his experience and training) (citation and 
quotation omitted). 
Additionally, "[observation of what reasonably appear to be furtive gestures is a 
factor which may properly be taken into account in determining whether probable cause 
exists." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.6(d), at 3 51 (4th ed. 2004) (citing [Sibron] 
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,66-67 (1968)). However, "[f]urtive movements or gestures alone 
are insufficient to constitute probable cause for search or arrest." State v. Holmes, 11A P.2d 
506, 511 (Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). Thus, where an officer sees individuals in 
possession of items that in his training and experience constitute drug paraphernalia, and the 
individuals "make an apparent attempt to conceal [those items] from police view, probable 
cause is present." LaFave, supra, § 3.6(d), at 352. See also id. § 3.6(b), at 318 n. 65, § 
3.6(d), at 351 n.162 & 352 n.164 (all collecting cases holding that probable cause is 
established where police see a person in possession of a suspicious object, and person 
thereafter tries to hide the item). 
This case. Applying the probable cause standard here, and considering the totality 
of the circumstances confronting the trooper, the trial court's ruling upholding the trooper's 
warrantless search of defendant's vehicle passes constitutional muster. As found by the trial 
court, defendant and her passenger had stopped in front of a vacant building twenty miles 
from the nearest town, and were approximately 200 miles off course from their stated 
destination. R144. See United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1129 (10th Cir. 2005) 
10 
(recognizing that "implausible travel plans" can provide a basis for further investigation). 
As the trooper approached, they were also hunched over the center console of the 
\ <-hi. : .-• . • \ .i •:• 'iv.x . •-•- w.itki;.^ ^jm, j \\ /.{• ai:oni <•-; .ap; iiic c:. j:w u::\ or .> :>,de 
window, both defendant and her passenger exhibited extreme nervousness and forth-H v ? *' • * * 
to conceal from the trooper's view items he recognized as drug paraphernalia. Id. 
Spcat^uhv. iMn' MM.^ LI i ^ seeing the trooper, defendant immediately let go of a rolled 
bill, and her passenger tried to hide -^p; • f *. -v !* l-u 
Watkins's training and experience these items are commonly associated with illicit drug use. 
vithough the large butane lighter could also be used to light a tobacco cigarette or 
the l\\ o to three inch lighter). Rather, a lighter that size could shoot a six inch fining ;mi' * • --
"more common in drug usage." Rl 52:30; ^ee a/so Rl 52:31, R144. Trooper Watkins could 
* :':..• -.ii^  . . :, L.. i. L s ii L nuu i. iunii controlled substances together with 
similar lighters; however, in just one werki -in ^'^\LI - 'iere<^ \ 
Moab, Utah, he estimated he found approximately sixteen similar lighters together with 
c< ... ..JU . uDstances. RI:>J:.> \:sce also u *- i i !e also had experience finding similar and 
smaller lighters topothiM-\\ i:V .1: !^-' : -u^unv—- i". (*l:r- • ag. Uuii. .mi-, ^ 1 ,:KC{VV\CL1: 
"On many occasions, numerous occasions I've seen similar lighters, not the exact shape or 
sizc[. ] but similar lighters, similar situations, always with a controlled substance." Id. Given 
MiNevjXM-i.':>.*.' 'J . ;*p-:-'. ••^-i;: - r,pcL. o.: . .. . :iese i icms were being used to ingest 
1 1 
illicit substances. R144; see also R152:32. SeeArvizu, 534 U.S. at 273; Dorsey, 731 P.2d 
at 1088 Alverez, 2005 UT App 145, \ 17. 
While an individual in possession of a rolled bill, napkin, and large butane lighter may 
well have an innocent purpose, given the totality of the circumstances here, the trial court 
properly found that Trooper Watkins had probable cause to believe that these items were 
being put to an illicit purpose. See State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) 
(paper bindle clearly incriminating in light of officer's training and experience that "such 
small, tightly shut paper packets are commonly used as containers for cocaine"). See also 
State v. Butler, 655 So.2d 1123, 1131 (Fla. 1995) (reliable informant's tip established 
probable cause for warrantless search where informant described Butler, his location, type 
of drugs Butler was selling, and the method delivery: rolled bills). 
To the extent there was doubt whether defendant and her passenger possessed these 
items for an illicit—as opposed to an innocent—purpose, their nervous reactions to Trooper 
Watkins appearance, including their attempts to conceal the items, compel the conclusion that 
they were using the items to ingest an illicit drug. See, e.g., Warlick v. Gross, 969 F.2d 303, 
309-310 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing presence of hand-rolled cigarettes combined with 
corroborating evidence like a defendant's attempts to conceal them can establish probable 
cause); Lewis v. State, 518 So.2d 214, 218 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (passing cigarette "in 
manner common to marijuana use" and then dropping and stepping on it as police 
approached constituted probable cause), abrogation on other grounds recognized by 
12 
Edwards v. State, 668 So.2d 167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); People v. Lilienthal, 587 P.2d 706, 
11 • • \-) 8) (probable cause to examine folded piece of paper Lilienthal dropped and 
and said that his suspicion that it contained narcotics was based on his experience in making 
numerous arrests where cocaine or heroin was transported in paper bindles similar to the one 
ui-i ' i . ^ • *i ..- „J \._v. i->. . . o i ,
 vprobable 
cause to seize small manilla envelope of the t> pe commonly i iseci In (in ig sales ^ vhere 
defendants furtively tried to conceal it from police); State v. Maguire, 523 A.2d 120, 124 
;> ) (probable cause where Maguire possessed a vial of the kind often used to carry 
•.*• -
r
 ' •' •
 rr
"*cr\ > \t'\\), Sinn c Ruffing, -+v-> i.__u 
1351, 1352 (N.H. 1985) (probable cause, as Ruffing, aware police had seen the remains of 
several hand-rolled cigarettes and rolling papers, knocked the cigarettes to the floor and tried 
tv) y in : iii. i•. .i pv i. . —;i., • • ^ , i ;edWsmo^ 
729 P.2d 547, 550 ^Jr. 1986) (nrobable cause where *TTKMI -riirnx^K v(.m,u--! 
paperfold from his pocket"); Sta/v r IT nut. 514 P. 2d 1 ^ v 1365 (Or. Ct. App. 1973; 
(pivraole cause where officer saw 1 iv.i'.t ; aiding a hand-rolled cigarette, and when Hunt saw 
the officer !v nnr -• - ;•> . : r - ! 'v vr.'uv" ' * tK< •" 
v. Commonwealth, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Va. 1976) (probable cause where officer shined 
spot-light into car and passenger threw hand-rolled cigarette t - (lie floor); State ) '. 
^
:4J * * * , .jibw Anere police received 
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confidential tip Thompson was selling large amounts of heroin, police thereafter saw him 
exchange money for a white object, and Thompson tossed a folded napkin into open window 
of vehicle as police approached); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 534 N.E.2d 24, 25-26 (Mass. 
Ct. App. 1989) (probable cause where Rivera was in a possession of a baggie like that 
regularly used in illicit drug transactions and also reacted to police presence with "behavior 
reasonably interpreted to be evasive or furtive"); People v. McRay, 416 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 
(N.Y. 1980) (recognizing that the exchange of a glassine envelope, together with "evidence 
of furtive or evasive behavior on the part of the participants suffices to establish probable 
cause"). Cf State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, ^ 11, 2005 WL 2877897 (holding that 
officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Singleton, recognizing that Singleton's "walking 
away" from officer "can be considered an act of evasion, which leads to reasonable 
suspicion, especially in light of the surrounding circumstances that included a hand-to-hand 
exchange in an area known for drug trafficking"). 
Defendant's authorities are not to the contrary. Indeed, two of defendant's cited cases 
are distinguishable because they involve scope of detention issues rather than probable cause 
to conduct a warrantless search. See State v. Naranjo, 2005 UT App 311, 118 P.3d 285 
(officer exceeded bounds of weapons frisk), and State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 
706 (officer unlawfully extended traffic stop to run warrant's check on passenger's license). 
Although State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185, similarly turns on whether police 
articulated probable cause, Hechtle is not dispositive because it involves neither observable 
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drug paraphernalia, nor any attempts to conceal paraphernalia. Id. at ^ 14. Rather, after 
stopping Hechtle for a traffic violation, the trooper in that case detained Hechtle and his 
passenger to investigate his suspicion that Hechtle was driving with any measurable 
controlled substance in his body. Id. at \ 5. Based on his observations, among others, that 
Hechtle and his passenger immediately lit cigarettes, that the passenger compartment 
contained several air fresheners, that Hechtle's eyes were red, droopy, and watery, and his 
pupils dilated, and that Hechtle's tongue was green and blistered, the trooper asked Hechtle 
to step out of the car to conduct field sobriety tests. Id. at ^ 2-5. However, rather than 
conduct the tests, the trooper frisked Hechtle for weapons and discovered a marijuana pipe. 
Id. at Tf 5. A search of the car, incident to Hechtle's arrest, revealed marijuana. Id. 
On appeal, this Court acknowledged that the cigarettes and air fresheners reasonably 
suggested Hechtle was attempting to mask a controlled substance, and that the condition of 
his eyes supported the trooper's suspicion that Hechtle was "engaged in criminal activity," 
but the Court refused to consider the green tongue evidence because it was unsupported by 
citation to scientific studies, case law, or other authority to support the reliability of the 
trooper's suspicion. Id. at Tf 13. Moreover, assuming the trooper's suspicions were 
reasonable, he failed to confirm them with field sobriety tests, or by involving a certified 
drug recognition expert. Id. at \ 14. Ruling the green tongue evidence unreliable, the Court 
declined to hold that there was probable cause to believe Hechtle was driving with any 
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measurable controlled substance in his body, emphasizing that the trooper had "noted no 
visible drug paraphernalia," or other signs of recent drug use. Id. 
Here, in contrast to Hechtle, Trooper Watkins saw "visible drug paraphernalia," a sign 
of recent drug use. Id. Moreover, the trooper also saw defendant and her passenger 
furtively try to conceal the items from his view. Given the wealth of authority that police 
observations of paraphernalia together with furtive behavior on the part of those possessing 
the paraphernalia constitutes probable cause, the trial court properly ruled that Trooper 
Watkins had probable cause to believe defendant and her passenger were engaged in criminal 
activity and that the warrantless automobile search was therefore justified. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's felony convictions for possession and for obstruction of justice, and her 
misdemeanor conviction for driving with any measurable controlled substance, should be 
affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
*f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982). 
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In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a). 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on^ftNovember 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
LRIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on J 2 6 November 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the BRIEF 
OF APPELLEE, to the following: 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
HARRIS & CARTER 
3325 N. University Ave., Ste. 200 
Jamestown Square, Clocktower Bldg. 
Provo, Utah 84604 
JK ^^TW^J^C^ 
17 
Addendum 
MAR-14-2005 HON 04:47 PH FOURTH DIST COURT HEBER 
THOMAS L LOW #6001 
Wasatch County AUotncy 
805 West 100 South 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
Telephone: (435) 654-2909 
Facsimile: (435) 654-2947 
TH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•IM i i i l i i i ••• • •
 mm0mtm^t , n , M M | | i 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REAGAN GRIFFITH 
Defendant. 
f ' ^ « » ^ ^ — 1 i l i i 1 ..••iitllilMM 1 -
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER. DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
! Case No. 
Judge Donald i. Eyre 
THE ABOVB-ENTITLED MATTER came before the Court for Suppression Hearing on 
November 19,2004. Plaintiff was ieprcaented by council, Thomas Low Defendant was present 
and represented by Shetdcn Carter. The Court had previously received evidence at a Preliminary 
Hearing. The Court having received additional evidence, argument, and briefing in connection 
with the Suppiession Hearing hold Novcmbei ] 9,2004, and being fully advised wi the premises, 
now hereby makes <md enters the following Findings of Fact; 
FIN DINGS OF FACT 
1. On the morning of May 2,2004, Trooper Harley Watkins was patrolling .Highway 
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6 as pan of his regular duties when he observed a vehicle parked at a vacant store 
in xhe Soldier Summit area of Wasatch County, Troopct Watkins stopped to see if 
the occupants of the vehicle needod assistance, as the nearest town was around 20 
miles away. Unbeknownst to Trooper Watkins, Defendant was in the driver's seat 
of the parked vehicle ingesting or preparing to ingest meihamphetamine. 
2. Trooper Watkins approached and parked behind and to the left of Defendant's 
vehicle. His manner of parking did not restrain or impede the ability of Defendant 
to move her vehicle had she chosen to do so, Trooper Watkins did not turn on his 
red-and-bluc lights or any take-down lights. He simply parked his patrol vehicle, 
exited it, and approached Defendant's vehicle 
3. Upon arriving at Defendant's vcloicle, Trooper Watkins tapped on the driver's side 
window to get Defendant's attention, Both Defendant and her passenger were 
leaning forward, hunched over the center console Trooper Watkins's tap startled 
Defendant. When Defendant looked up, Trooper Watkins was able to see that she 
possessed a rolled-up dollar hill, which she then dropped Trooper Watkins was 
also able to see that her passenger was holding a napkin and a butane lighter, 
which he was trying to conceal, 
4. Defendant and her passenger, upon obsetving Trooper Watkins, became very 
nervous and appeared to be attempting to co&ccal their activities, 
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5. Trooper W t^kins asked Defendant where she was going, and she responded thai 
she was coming from the Las Vegas area cm Interstate 15 and was going to 
Interstate 70. Trooper Watkins observed that, in that event, sha had missed her 
freeway by 200 miles, 
6. Trooper Watkins has substantial training and experience in the recognition of 
illegal drugs and their associated paraphernalia, including service undercover on a 
narcotics interdiction task forte, Trooper Watkins testified that he had found 
rolled-Lip bills and lighters similar to the one Defendant's passenger was holding 
on many prior occasions in drug encounters. He further testified that he had never 
observed anybody light tobacco with such a lighter. This type of lighter, he 
testified, shoots a flame much larger than a typical cigarette lighter, and is used, in 
hi$ experience, almost exclusively for the ingestion of drugs, 
7, The Conn finds that Trooper Watkins's training and experience are sufficient to 
inform him and the Court that he recognized the rolled-up dollar bill and the 
butane torch as drug paraphernalia. The trooper's conclusion was further 
supported by his observation thai Defendant and her passenger were easily startled 
and became very nervous and apparently intent on concealing their activities. 
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BASED ON THE foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I- Trooper Watkim initial contact with Defendant was a Level One encounter. 
wherein he was merely offering to assist. 
2. Upon viewing the drug paraphernalia and the behavior cf Defendant and her 
pwwugor, Trooper Walking had probable cause to search vehicle. 
BASED ON THE foregoing
 M n g S of fact and con^sions of ] a w . tbeCou* now makes and 
enters the following 
ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's
 n o f y p to mvppu u denied. 
DATED this 13 
APPROVAL AS TO 'FORM; 
SHELDEN CARTER, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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RULE 4-504 NOTICE 
Defendant and his counsel arc hereby notified that iht above Order wil] be submitted to 
the Court for signature S days from the date that it was mailed to you, unless you notify counsel 
for the Plaintiff thai you object to its form or contsni. 
THOMAS L. LOW, AttorneTfbrPb^irf 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
! t a * y certify,ha,,raai W , o d M t u u u i m M ^ r f ( ] ] s f M ^ ^ 
Jj^_ day of February, 2005, to; 
Sbelden Carter 
Harris & Carter 
3325 North University Avenue, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
FAX No. (801) 377-1149 
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